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PROCEEDINGS 

OF THE 

SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 

OF THE 

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 



HELD AT 

CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
DECEMBER 27-28, ioopr 



TOGETHER WITH 

THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT 
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH 



BY 

PROFESSOR H. N. GARDINER 



[Reprinted from the Philosophical Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2, March, 1908.] 



{Reprinted from the Philosophical Review, Vol. XVII., No. 2, March, 1908.] 



THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 

IN speaking on the same subject as that selected for the Discus- 
sion that is to take place to-morrow morning, I do not seek 
to forestall the results of that discussion. Nor shall I attempt to 
deal with what to many may seem the more profound and signif- 
icant aspects of the problem, such as, for example, the relation 
of our finite knowing to absolute knowing, or the place which 
our particular truths must have in a final and complete meta- 
physical system. My aim is rather to set forth simply and clearly 
some of the more general considerations that ought, in my 
judgment, to be kept in mind when this subject is under debate. 
Now the first requisite in this discussion is surely a definite 
understanding as to what truth the discussion is about. * True ' 
and ' false' are adjectives like ' red ' and ' sweet' or ' good ' and 
' bad,' and, like them, must be taken to qualify some object or ob- 
jects. But the objects they actually are taken to qualify are various, 
and hence an ambiguity in the conception of truth. We not only 
apply the terms to ideas, supposals, judgments, propositions, 
beliefs, and the like, but we also meet with true and false friends, 
true courage and beauty, false modesty and honor, and, alas, 
sometimes false dice, hair, and teeth. In this sense falsity may 
be itself a character of truth : " his faith unfaithful kept him 
falsely true." In the Hegelian philosophy we have another use 
of the term, according to which the higher category is truer than 
the lower, teleology is the truth of mechanism, spirit the truth of 
nature. We shall avoid at least one source of confusion if we 

1 Delivered as the Presidential Address before the American Philosophical Asso- 
ciation at Cornell University, December 27, 1907. 

lI 3 



114 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

agree, to begin with, that our concern is with the truth of propo- 
sitions. We assume that propositions are either true or false, or 
neither true nor false, or, in case a number of propositions are 
involved, are at once partly true and partly false, and that, in any 
case, regarding any intelligible proposition the question can be 
asked whether it is true or false, and in what way. 

If we agree to this, then certain not inconsiderable conse- 
quences would seem to follow. One, and most important, is that 
we recognize the truth we are talking about as a quality found in 
quite particular truths. For every proposition, whatever its range 
or comprehension, expresses and embodies a single, even if com- 
plex, truth, and the number of possible truths is as infinite as the 
number of possible propositions. This is not to say that truths 
are disconnected, or are, or relate to, ' independent entities,' or are 
merely externally connected in a series. Propositions hang 
together ; one truth implies, follows from, leads to another. 
Hence the possibility is not excluded that many truths may 
cohere together to form a system, and that all truths may ulti- 
mately appear as elements in one comprehensive system or realm 
of truth. But this last should not be dogmatically assumed at 
the outset in such a way as to prejudice investigation into the 
nature and conditions of particular truths. Not even the most 
resolute defender of an absolute system would maintain that such 
a system was even remotely attainable by man. 1 Not only have 
the propositions in common use little or no evident connection, 
but within the most organized forms of our knowledge, — the 
sciences, — principles of wide import in one department are 
totally ignored in others. Moreover, a system of truth is really, 
from the propositional point of view, a system of truths, and can- 
not, as such, be expressed or exhibited in any single proposition. 
Philosophers, as we know too well, often require for the expres- 
sion of their systems one or several pretty ponderous volumes. 
A true system would be one, all of whose propositions were true 
and also connected. Propositions about the system, however, 
are just as particular as propositions about its parts or about the 

1 " It would be impossible that any man should have a world, the various provinces 
of which were quite rationally connected, or appeared always in a system." Bradley, 
Appearance and Reality, p. 367. 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 115 

connections of its parts. At the outset, then, we ought, I think, 
in this discussion to recognize to the full the particularity of all 
propositional truths, and that whether they have to do with the 
more special or the more general aspects of their subject-matter. 
We ought, as far as possible, to avoid talking of truth ' at large ' ; 
and we ought equally to be on our guard against any bias in 
favor of a peculiar type of truth, as, for example, scientific as 
opposed to philosophical truth, or vice versa, or of either as 
against the episodical truths of every-day life. For if every 
propositional truth is particular, there is no prima facie reason 
for regarding one as more or less true than another, so far, that 
is, as it is true at all. Truths differ in value and significance ; 
some are trivial, some perhaps sublime. But, apart from special 
theory, there is no apparent reason why a proposition about even 
so trivial a circumstance as the present state of the weather, — 
which indeed may be important enough on occasion, — should 
not be as true as the truest propositions about such exalted 
objects as the existence of God, the constitution of the universe,, 
and the destiny of the human soul. 

The next point is, that the truth of any proposition must be 
judged with reference to its own unique meaning and intent. 
It means to assert something specific about something in particu- 
lar, whether the form of the proposition be particular or general. 
If it means to assert something about 'this,' it must not be con- 
demned because it does not assert something else, or because it 
tells you nothing about ' that,' or because it does not exhaust: 
the possibilities or attain the ideal of a fully unified knowledge. 
It may be quite true, for example, that a certain train is scheduled 
to leave the station at five o'clock, whatever may be true, in 
metaphysical reference, as to the nature of space and time or, in 
economic reference, as to the management of a railway system. 
But if this is so, then we cannot admit, from the propositional 
point of view, that doctrine of ' degrees of truth ' which asserts 
that every proposition is partly false because of the modification 
it would receive by supplementation and re-arrangement when 
brought into relation with other elements which, for the time 
being, have been left out of account. This assertion appears to 



Il6 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

rest on a different conception of truth, Judged by its own mean- 
ing and intent, a proposition may be true without being all that 
is true, and a truth that is only true about the whole need not 
be more wholly true than one that is about the meanest of its 
parts. Again, a proposition that is complex may contain more 
truth than another without on that account being any more true. 
It is plausibly objected to this, that truths are not independent, 
that they at least tend to systematic union. And this we have 
admitted. But then, it is said, as elements in a system, each 
truth must modify and be modified by all the others ; as a mem- 
ber of the system, it cannot remain what it was in isolation, it gets 
transformed, and the more so in proportion to the width and 
depth of its connections. And from this it follows, on the argu- 
ment, regarding ' Reality ' as a system one of whose aspects is a 
completely unified ' Truth,' that all truths, in the end, are 'error,' 
and that, for example, mathematics, the most exact of the sci- 
ences, is also, as the most abstract, the least ' true ' of all. 1 We 
escape this consequence, I think, by holding strictly to our prin- 
ciple that the truth of any proposition must be judged with refer- 
ence to its own unique meaning and intent, and by distinguishing 
between truth and its evaluation. A given truth does, indeed, 
suffer modification in being systematically connected with other 
truths, but such modification need not be at all one of the truth 
of the proposition, but only of the way the truth is held, under- 
stood, and appreciated. Thus the schoolboy may know only the 
isolated truths that 5 + 2 = 7 and that 5 x 2 = 10 ; but if he 
later comes to see that these truths are connected, that 5 + 2 = 7 
because 5 x 2=10, and vice versa, that neither would be true 
if the other were false, or if, as a philosophical mathematician, he 
holds a theory of numbers which throws light on the nature and 
connection of these propositions, he certainly holds these truths 
in a different way, they have for him a different value ; but how 
has the truth of either proposition been itself affected ? That 
5 + 2 = 7 is, I suppose, as true, neither more nor less, to the 
mathematician as to the schoolboy, though the former has so 
many more connected truths at command that it has for him a 
richer signification. For truths too, like sensible facts, have an 

1 Bradley, Appearance ana' /\ea/i/r, p. 370. 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. II 7 

import beyond their own intrinsic quality. Of course, the propo- 
sition in question is quite true only relatively to the general 
character of its own number system ; but this was implied in its 
assertion. But in this reference its truth would not be in the 
least affected by the discovery, or invention, of a different number 
system, if that were possible, just as a truth in Euclid is not 
affected by the equally valid, though less serviceable, truths of 
other geometrical systems. 

The fact that one truth is not, as such, altered by its connec- 
tion with other truths, may appear perhaps in a still clearer light, 
if we take a case where, as things stand, there is no such connec- 
tion, and then imagine what would happen if such a connection 
were brought about. " This table is round," and " this table 
cost $500," are propositions which have no sort of logical con- 
nection ; and hence the truth of the one would, in so far, be 
unaffected by that of the other. But suppose that round tables 
were exceedingly difficult to make, and that, besides being rare 
for this reason, they were esteemed peculiarly beautiful. Then 
they would be objects desired of the rich and coveted by the 
connoisseur, and a connection between the shape and the price 
would be so definitely established that we should see at once that 
a true proposition about the one would involve a corresponding 
proposition about the other. But would either proposition be 
more or less true ? Would the table be any more or less round, 
or its price any dearer or cheaper ? The suggestion is manifestly 
absurd. The difference would lie not in the truth, but in the 
truth's evaluation. 

It being understood, then, that the truth we are talking about 
is truth of propositions, that every proposition is specific, and that 
its truth is relative to its intended meaning, we may now state 
the essential problems in regard to this kind of truth. They may 
be expressed in two questions : (1) What do we mean by calling 
any proposition true? and (2) How do we know that it is really 
true? Or, otherwise stated, (1) What is the nature of the claim 
we make for it when we call it true ? and (2) How is this claim 
either established or discredited ? The first question relates to 
the nature of truth, the second to its evidence. 



Il8 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

But before we attempt to deal with these questions, we ought, 
I think, to enquire more. particularly, first, into the nature of the 
object to which the predicates 'true' and 'false' are applied, and 
the possession of which constitutes that object a truth or a falsity. 
We have agreed that our concern is with the truth of proposi- 
tions, but the truth of a proposition is clearly not resident in the 
mere form of the words. What is true, if true, and false, if false, 
— and also, it may be added, what is doubtful, possible, neces- 
sary, etc., — is, primarily, what is asserted. In what is asserted 
we seem to have the original locus of a propositional truth. If 
what is asserted is true, then, and only then, is the proposition 
true, and thereby whatever mental act, content, or attitude it 
expresses on the part of the individual making or holding the 
proposition ; and contrariwise, if it is false. Now to apply the 
adjectives 'true' and 'false' directly to what is asserted, we have, 
curiously enough, to change the form of the proposition. In 
the proposition something is asserted of something, something is 
declared to be or not to be, to happen or not to happen, or, in 
general, to be so-and-so characterized. If now what is asserted 
is to be itself characterized, if, for example, it is to be qualified as 
true or false, it must itself be expressed as the subject of another 
proposition having such a character as its predicate. And this, 
as especially pointed out by Meinong, is done by expressing the 
'what' that is asserted by a sentence beginning with ' that,' or by 
some form of words equivalent to such a sentence. Thus in the 
proposition, " crows are black," what is asserted is that crows 
are black. The question we must now ask is, What is the logical 
import of such a //W-sentence ? A proper answer should throw 
some light on the meaning of truth. 

In dealing with this question, we may proceed in either of two 
ways : we may abstract altogether from the thinking process and 
consider only the logical character of what is asserted, or we may 
connect the latter with the process out of which the assertion 
issues and the attitude in which its truth or falsity is recognized, 
and seek to determine its position and character relatively to that. 
From either point of view, its most salient feature appears to be 
that of belonging to an ideal realm of meaning distinct from and, 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 119 

in a way, opposed to concrete and actually existent fact. That 
this paper is white, is neither an existing thing, like the paper, 
nor a real predicate of existence, like the paper's whiteness. The 
white paper exists, but I cannot in the same way say ' that this 
paper is white ' exists. I do not mean that this truth can in no 
sense be said to be. It can be made the object of a reflective 
thought, it can be examined as such, it can be talked about and 
become the subject of other true or false propositions. Thus, if 
it is false that this paper is white, then that this is false, is true. 
The point is that what is asserted is always ideal, and is never 
identical in existence with the object that the assertion is about. 
This is true even in the case when the latter object is itself ideal. 
'That 3 is greater than 2,' for example, is neither the number 3, 
nor the number 2, nor the greater magnitude of the one as com- 
pared with the other. This difference gives rise to the problem 
as to the relation of the two, the relation of the meaning to the 
fact meant, in which it is usual to find the defining character of 
truth. Leaving this for the present, I may here point to an im- 
portant consequence of the distinction. 

There is high authority for the doctrine that truth (and also 
error) is a content of predication qualifying reality, a doctrine 
which is developed in the assertion that perfect truth would be 
the universe. 1 But if our distinction holds good, either this is 
impossible, or it relates to another kind of truth than proposi- 
tional truth. For the truth that so-and-so, for example, that this 
paper is white, is neither the subject of the proposition, nor the 
predicate, nor any quality of the object taken as real, but some- 
thing quite different, namely, a truth about it. How is the case 
altered if for a particular finite object, like this paper, we substi- 
tute ' Reality ' or the universe ? For whether the content by 
which the subject of a proposition or judgment is qualified, — and 
you may interpret your proposition so as to make the ' real ' sub- 
ject anything you please, — whether this content, I say, be con- 
ceived as a simple quality, or as a complex of qualifying relations, 
or, again, be conceived in abstraction as an ' idea ' divorced from 

1 "We must unhesitatingly assert that truth ... if for itself it were perfect, would 
be itself in the fullest sense the entire and absolute universe." Bradley, " On Truth 
and Copying," Mind, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 170. 



120 THE JFHILOSOPHTCAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

existence, or concretely applied as actually qualifying an existent 
thing, there is, I submit, a clear distinction to be drawn between 
any finite object, or reality at large, taken as the subject of predica- 
tion together with whatever it may be said to be or to have, and 
the truth (or falsity) that it is, or is of such a sort, or has such and 
such a character. The character of a being is one thing, and may 
be called an idea or the object of an idea, as we choose to define 
it ; but that a being has this character is surely not an identity, 
pure and simple, with the character itself. If, therefore, we assume 
that Reality is one whole of being with a definite structure, and 
that this structure, its defining content, is grasped in a single 
thought, this thought, I suppose, might be said to possess the 
world in idea. But unless the thought went on to actually predi- 
cate of Reality as its structure the content thought, it would not 
possess the truth that Reality was so defined. But if it should 
effect this predication, then this truth, that Reality was so de- 
fined, would be, as truth and meaning, quite distinct from the 
content predicated, and this even though it were itself included 
in it. I am not, of course, maintaining that it is possible to grasp 
the world's structure without judging, or denying, on the other 
hand, the possibility of a speculative grasp, or aesthetic expe- 
rience, of reality beyond judgment. I am only maintaining that 
the so-called ' truth ' embodied in the content of predication, 
though the universe were the subject and though its whole con- 
tent were exhausted in the predicate, would not be identical with- 
out difference with the truth of any possible proposition. And I 
accordingly deny that truth, in the propositional sense, is, prop- 
erly speaking, a defining quality of any real being at all. It is 
neither the subject nor the predicate of a judgment ; it is neither 
substantival nor adjectival. It is a form of ideality, but its own 
unique form. 

Viewed in se this form appears, in each instance of it, to be {a) 
objective, that is, something cognized, or to be cognized, as dis- 
tinct from the processes of cognizing on the part of any individual 
mind. Hence it may be treated, for certain purposes, inde- 
pendently, just as physical objects are treated independently in 
the physical sciences, without reference to the conditions of our 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 121 

knowledge of them. It appears (ti) as universal, that is, as 
claiming recognition and acknowledgment on the part of all 
minds. But whether it is actually acknowledged or not by any 
particular mind, seems indifferent to it. Failure to acknowledge 
it may be due to ignorance or to mental incapacity. Hence it 
may be maintained that truths, as such, are independent of their 
recognition by any mind at all. Truth, on this view, would con- 
sist in an ideal relation between w T hat is theoretically capable of 
being asserted and the objective fact that the assertion, if made, 
would be about. So extreme a contention we may not now be 
prepared to admit ; but the recognition of even the relative inde- 
pendence of truth should serve, I think, as a salutary check on 
the tendency evident in recent discussion to interpret the prob- 
lem of truth exclusively in terms of the process by which the 
claims of our ideas to recognition as true are tested and estab- 
lished. The view referred to would mean, I suppose, at least 
this, that there are real facts in the world, and hence, ideally, 
truths about those facts which are unknown and some of which, 
from the very nature of the case, are incapable of becoming 
known by any finite mind. And this we seem compelled to admit. 
For not only is knowledge progressive, so that more facts and 
objects get known or better known, but an infinity of facts col- 
lectively known are unknown to any single mind, and an infinity 
of facts once collectively known become irrecoverably lost, 
namely, the personal experiences of the individuals that made up 
the succession of all the generations past. Moreover, no finite 
mind knows, or pretends to know, the world's infinite multi- 
plicity in all its details, nor the specific ground or grounds of its 
differences, nor all the implications of any one of its actual experi- 
ences. No one, however relative to our thought and purpose 
he holds the world to be, seriously believes that it is wholly 
plastic, that it is wholly made and remade by our volition, and 
that there is nothing, I will not say merely given, but given in 
any sense at all to be simply acknowledged, or that fact and 
truth only are as they are discovered by us. But if this is so, 
then the distinction between truth and recognized truth, as well 
as between truth and the process of testing and acknowledging 



122 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

it, would seem to have theoretical importance, even though it 
should be held that what is truth for us cannot be determined 
concretely apart from the conditions under which it is known. 1 

Relatively to the act and process of knowledge, the meaning 
that is capable of setting up a claim to recognition as true may be 
viewed in several ways. Primarily it is of the nature of a sup- 
posal. The ideal meaning may be simply entertained. So far, 
though the supposal be false, there is no error. If, however, it is 
accepted, there is judgment and belief, and the belief may be 
erroneous ; but if it is also accepted, so to say, by the object as 
tested by the criteria suitable to the case in question, there is true 
opinion and knowledge. Three distinctions, pointed out by 
Meinong, seem to be essential in the analysis of judgment. We 
distinguish (i) the act of judging, — a temporal event in the men- 
tal history of the individual ; (2) the object or subject-matter that 
the judgment is about, — this maybe anything you please, but it 
is at any rate something other than the thinking and the partic- 
ular thought that aims at the knowledge of it ; and (3) the thought 
or supposal as an ideal, but immanent, objective content, — what 
the object is thought as, and what is asserted in the proposition. 
Here the problem of truth concerns the relation of the 'immanent,' 
thought-possessed, but objective content of the supposal to the 
contrasted ' transcendent ' or quasi-transcendent object that the 
supposal's content means to be true of. 

Another way of viewing the matter is to consider the supposal, 
the content of meaning expressed in the that-sentence, as of the 
nature of an answer to a question, or the solution of a problem. 2 

1 Besides objectivity and universality, it is usual to ascribe timelessness and 
unchangeability also to what is asserted, taken as true ; and these characters, inter- 
preted in a logical and not in a temporal sense, would seem to hold except in cases 
where the notion of time enters into the predication, and there the relations are pecul- 
iar. If the reference is to past time, the truth (<?. g. y that Ccesar existed) would not 
be true before the event, but would be unalterably true after it ; if to future time, it 
would be unchangeably true before the event, and would cease to be true after it ; 
while, if referring to present time, its truth would be limited to the present. The 
facts may be otherwise interpreted so as to make the truth appear timeless in all cases, 
and only its recognition an event. Hut the matter cannot be further pursued here. 
Given the fact, however, the special relation of its own truth to it is timeless in any 
case. 

1 It is from this point of view that Stout treats, successfully, I think, the problem 
of error in his essay in Personal Idealism* The point of view itself, however, 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 23 

I do not, of course, mean that every time we frame a proposition 
we first consciously propound a question. But we can always 
put a question to which the proposition gives the answer. It 
answers such questions as whether, or what, or why, or how. 
And so far as it is an intelligible proposition, it is a specific answer 
to a specific question, and its truth or falsity must be judged with 
reference to its intention to answer just that question. This is 
but the familiar doctrine that we can't tell, and can't even properly 
inquire, whether a proposition is true or false till we know what 
it means, that is, what it means to assert and about what. And 
herein lies one of the most fruitful sources of error, that we don't 
always ourselves know what precisely it is that we do mean. It 
has been held, indeed, that this vagueness infects, in some degree, 
all our thinking, and that no one in asserting knows precisely 
the sense in which he affirms or denies. 1 But this assertion must 
itself, on the hypothesis, be at least a little vague, and must mean 
something at least a little different from what it seems to mean. 
Is it necessary to push scepticism so far ? We can hardly hope 
in all cases to escape the pitfalls of language. But there are 
cases where our meanings can be referred to well-defined abstract 
relations, as in mathematics, and a sensible fact, to which other 
of our meanings are relative, can be, if not defined, pointed out 
and experienced. Our meanings must, in any case, be adequate 
to our purposes. Assuming that our meanings can be made 
adequate to our purposes, we demand of the proposition that it 
shall satisfactorily meet the conditions of our problem. The 
problem of truth, then, is to determine what, in specific cases, 
these satisfactory conditions may be. 

With these considerations in mind, we now ask, What do we 
mean by calling a proposition true? — for a proposition is cer- 
tainly not made true simply by being called so. The question, 
therefore, is, What is meant by a proposition being true ? True, 
we ask, to what ? and also, to whom ? 

The answers commonly given to these questions are, as we all 

goes back to Plato, who represents thinking as a sort of conversation in which the 
soul asks and answers questions. When the thought is decided, says yes or no, we 
have 66^a, or judgment. See Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre, p. 1 15. 
1 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 367. 



124 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

know, these. A proposition is true when the idea, thought, or 
meaning it expresses agrees with reality, or the facts, — reality, or 
fact, being what it is true to ; and, a proposition is true when the 
thought it expresses coincides with what would be the thought 
of an ideal thinker who had actual knowledge of the facts, — such 
an ideal thinker, actual or merely conceived, being the subject 
for whom it is true. In either case a proposition is called on to 
validate its claim to truth by reference to a standard, on the one 
hand, the standard of fact, on the. other, the standard of an ideal 
thought. In the first case, the emphasis is on the verifiable 
objectivity; in the second, on the logical universality of truth- 
This, in its most general terms, is the 'intellectualist' view of 
truth ; and so long as we stick to these most general terms and 
ask no embarrassing questions, it is the view which we all, I 
suppose, in a manner, accept. At any rate our leading pragma- 
tist assures us that the definition of truth as agreement, and of 
falsity as disagreement, of our ideas with reality is accepted by 
pragmatists and intellectualists alike as 'a matter of course.' l 

But the difficulty here is to agree on what we mean by the 
terms of this definition. Following the indications already given, 
we come to some such conclusions as the following. 

First as to the ' idea.' The truth we are considering being 
truth of propositions, the idea must not be taken primarily as a 
bit of psychic existence, a subjective state of mind or an event 
occurring in the flow of consciousness ; nor must it be taken as 
a single term, like the idea of ' red ' or of ' equality ' : such single 
terms or concepts, apart from their use in propositions, may be 
said perhaps to be accurate or inaccurate, but cannot be said to 
be either true or false. The idea that is to ' agree with reality ' 
must be the whole objective, immanent meaning of the supposal, 
that so-and-so. 

With this understanding of the term 'idea,' we ought to have 
no great difficulty in explaining what, in general, we mean by the 
other term in the relation of agreement declared to be essential 
to the constitution of a truth. The term 'reality' is, indeed, in 
my judgment, unfortunate, since it suggests too much the idea 
of either a physical or a metaphysical entity. But true proposi- 
1 James, Pragmat\sm t p. 198. 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 25 

tions may be made about anything thinkable, and the range of 
the thinkable is unlimited. True propositions may be made, for 
example, about imaginary objects, like Alice in Wonderland, and 
impossible objects, like the perpetnnm mobile and ropes of sand, 
as well as about things that actually exist and events that actually 
happen ; and although these propositions may be interpreted as 
having an indirect reference to a world of objects regarded as 
more truly ' real,' it hardly seems necessary to do this in all cases 
in order to give them an intelligible meaning or to acquire insight 
into their truth. 1 But undoubtedly propositions, whether true or 
false, mean to assert about something. They may be taken as 
meaning to answer a specific question which one might intel- 
ligibly ask about the something in question. And obviously the 
right answer, the answer which would satisfy the interest of 
knowledge, whatever other interests it might or might not satisfy, 
would depend on the constitution, actual or ideal, of the object 
or subject-matter of the inquiry, and not alone on the cognitive 
activities and subjective interests of the thinker. He may even 
have himself made the object, in the more obvious sense of 
' made ' ; it may be his sonnet ; or it may be the experiences 
which are special to him and in their uniqueness unsharable, like 
the interior play of his mental imagery : the object once constituted, 
be its constitution eternal or limited in existence to the fleeting 
moment, demands cognitive recognition in its own right and dic- 
tates the terms under which a true answer can be given to any 
intelligible question about it. By ' reality ' or ' fact,' then, in this 
connection, we mean whatever in the object of the thought or sub- 
ject-matter of the enquiry must be taken account of in determin- 
ing the nature of the answer, satisfactory to the intelligence, to a 
specific and intelligible question about it. ' Fact ' is whatever in 
the object, be it sensible or ideal, a thing or event or action or 
attribute or any mode of relation, so controls the process of 
knowing that object as to make the thought or supposal not only 
acceptable to the individual thinker, but fit for acceptance uni- 
versally ; for such universality is logically implied, as we have 
seen, in the conception of truth. Thought so controlled is true, 

1 Attention may be called in this connection to the important investigations in 
Gegenstandstheorie by Meinong and his school. 



126 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

whatever subjective motives may guide and inspire it ; thought 
not so controlled yields no knowledge, however great the sub- 
jective assurance to the contrary. And perhaps so far there is 
no real ground for dispute. The dispute, I suppose, would relate 
to the nature of the control. Certainly no intellectualist has 
emphasized more strongly the coerciveness of outer fact and of 
certain ' relations of ideas ' or, as we should prefer to say, ideal 
objects that function as facts than Professor James. He admits 
expressly that at least certain truths are determined in advance 
of our recognitions and any pragmatic testing of them. 1 

I might be expected, perhaps, at this point to consider whether 
the ' reality ' with which our ideas, to be true, should agree is 
not, in the end, no special and particular fact, least of all such 
imaginary objects as fairy tales and such impossible objects as 
round squares and ropes of sand, but ' absolute ' reality, whose 
content, or one of whose aspects, is ' absolute ' truth, which sets 
the standard for all ' truth ' that is merely relative and finite. 
But a thorough discussion of this view would lead us too far, 
and I have already, I think, sufficiently indicated my position. 
I admit, certainly, that truths are connected together and tend 
to cohere in systems, though I have not been able to see that 
one truth interferes with another truth in the system from relation 
to which it derives an added significance. And I admit, of course, 
the linkages of facts, but I am similarly unable to see that one fact, 
from the point of view from which it is the particular fact that it is, 
is transcended and annulled through relation to other facts. The 
idea is thus suggested of an ultimate system of reality and an ulti- 
mate system of coherent truth, and this may perhaps be called 'ab- 
solute.' But, as we have seen, no such conspectus of the systematic 
connection of all realities and of all truths is attainable by man, 
and it is even conceivable that no such ideal system, completely 
self-fulfilled, actually exists, but that it is the end-term of a creative 
process in the universe itself. The universe has, we assume, a 
fundamental nature and constitution, and this grounds the possi- 
bility of truth, but also, we must add, of error. Meanwhile, as our 
Hegelian teachers tell us, anything may be taken as ' real ' which 

1 " The hundredth decimal of tt is predetermined ideally now, though no one may 
have computed it." Pragmatism, p. 211. 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 27 

is taken for what it is and not for something that it is not. From 
this point of view, I have insisted that the truth of a proposition 
must be judged from its own chosen standpoint, the particular 
question it means to answer, and the special reality, fact, or object 
it selects and intends. And since our theme is the truth of 
propositions, and any proposition about the ' Absolute ' and its 
relation to finite truth would, from our point of view, be no more 
true and would certainly seem much more difficult to establish 
than a proposition telling us, for example, what o'clock it is ; 
since, practically, in many cases we have no need to appeal to 
the high court of metaphysics to derive satisfactory answers to 
our questions, and in many others have simply to ignore our 
metaphysical theories to get any valuable answers at all ; since 
no way has ever been devised whereby we could use the ' abso- 
lute' criterion to measure our other truths by; since the concep- 
tion of such a criterion and the conclusions drawn from it imply a 
conception of truth different from the propositional ; and since, 
finally, we are assured that, in the end, there is no relation 
between truth and reality at all, since, in the end, there are no 
separate terms, 1 whereas this relation is just now our problem : 
I hope that these reasons for not pursuing the subject further 
may be deemed sufficient. 

A difficulty might, however, be found in the conception of a 
relation of truth to fact, in that what is taken to be true is also 
taken to be the fact. If it is true, for example, that I exist, then 
that I exist is also a fact. Hence, it might be argued, there can 
be no relation of agreement or correspondence between truth and 
fact, since no difference between them can be discovered. 2 The 
difficulty, I take it, is purely verbal, and may be escaped by a 
verbal distinction. We may distinguish, if we choose, between 
fact that and fact of; the real distinction is between the object of 
the assertion and the content of the supposal or judgment. My 
existence is a fact, and the truth that I exist is also a fact ; but 
the latter is surely not precisely and numerically identical with 
the fact of my existence, regarded as the real content of my 

1 Bradley, "On Truth and Copying," Mind, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 172 f. 
2 So G. E. Moore, article on "Truth" in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy, 
Vol. II, p. 717 (6). 



128 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

being. It is a fact that the horse is a mammal, but this truth 
does not take into itself bodily the quadruped and its mammalian 
character, nor does it itself enter into the beast's vitals. 

What, then, we at length ask, is the nature of that relation be- 
tween idea and fact indicated by the term ' agreement ' ? Ideas 
to be true must agree with the facts, but how agree ? 

The view that a truth is, in some literal fashion, a i copy ' of 
the fact, is now pretty generally discredited. Too much honor 
is done it when it is accorded a limited sphere of validity in 
the relation of the mental image to its original. For granted 
that the image is a true and faithful copy, it (the image) is no 
more a truth, in the propositional sense, than any external re- 
sembling object ; and the truth that it is like the original, while 
clearly in some sense agreeing with the fact of the resemblance 
of which it takes account, neither is that resemblance nor a copy 
of it. Yet even those writers who are most emphatic in reject- 
ing the copy theory of truth not infrequently employ language 
which implies some form of correspondence. They will complain 
that their own views are misrepresented, or that those of their 
opponents bear no sort of likeness to the facts. And quite lately 
Mr. Bradley, after demolishing, from his own point of view, the 
copy theory as false in principle, goes on to mention four senses 
in which, from a lower point of view (which is, of course, our 
own), truth may be said to correspond with reality and even to 
reproduce fact. It is interesting to observe that the first three 
of these senses, referring to the acquisition of truth (the fourth 
referring to its communication), reduce essentially to that demand 
for the control of thought by the object, of which I have spoken : 
the individual must suppress what is special to him to attain 
what the thought of the many individuals must conform to ; he 
must follow the object in whose ideal development he cooperates ; 
and he must take up in reflection the given qualities of sensible 
matter and accept more or less brute conjunctions of fact. 1 These 
meanings may be generalized in the statement that a thought, to 
be true, must submit to the control of whatever objective condi- 
tions predetermine its fitness for universal acceptance. 

1, « On Truth and Copying," Mind, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 174 f. 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 29 

But the ' correspondence ' of truth with fact is usually taken 
as a static relation in the result of thinking. Can any intelligible 
meaning be given to this conception ? I incline to think that 
there can, although I admit a difficulty in expressing it, and 
shall, therefore, not be surprised if what I am about to say may 
seem crude and unsatisfactory. Still I am convinced that there 
is such a relation. Take, for example, the mental image which, 
by hypothesis, resembles, or copies, the percept. This object 
we both think and think about. Hence an ambiguity in the 
conception of the ' content ' of our thought. On the one hand, 
what is thought is the object, the mental image. But this image, 
as we have seen, is not a truth, but an existent fact, whose re- 
semblance to the percept demands our recognition. On the other 
hand, what is thought is that this object resembles the percept. 
And this, by hypothesis, is true and a truth. But this objective 
content of the thought, — to repeat a reflection now familiar, — 
is neither the image, nor the percept, nor anything that bears the 
slightest resemblance to them. It is the thought, and in the 
proposition the assertion, of their resemblance. But how could 
this assertion be truly made unless the meaning of both terms 
and the meaning of their resemblance were contained and estab- 
lished ideally in the thought of them ? We use, to express the 
presence to a mind of this meaning of the object, the metaphor 
of reflection, and this suggests a prior independent existence of 
the object and some sort of copying. But there need be no 
priority in time, nor need the object have an existence beyond 
thought or apart from its presence in the reflection. The con- 
ception suits equally well an idealistic and a realistic interpretation. 
The full thought, in fact, is a reflected thought : it is at once a 
thought of and a thought about. And the complexion, — the 
terms and relations that make up the complex structure, — of the 
intended object, in that aspect of it which is at the time in ques- 
tion, must, it would seem, be ideally taken up into and define 
the complexion of the reflected content, whenever that content 
is true. Or we may say, perhaps, that it is the same content 
from different points of regard. It is impossible to avoid meta- 
phors ; but they must not be unduly pressed. The reflection in 



130 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

thought is not on all fours with reflection in a mirror ; it does 
not in the same way 'copy' its object; it apprehends and ideally 
assimilates it. I am speaking here, of course, of recognized 
truths. As to truths unrecognized by any human mind, we 
should have, I suppose, to define them, — apart from the admis- 
sion of other forms of mind, and ultimately an omniscient mind, 
— as the capacity in the object — it is impossible to avoid the 
thought-reference — to manifest itself to some mind as being 
of the sort, character, or complexion that it is, that is, that it has 
in it to be seen to be whenever, under describable conditions, it 
is so manifested. 

Truth, then, as related to the act of cognition, is intellectually 
reflected fact. The important question then is, How do you 
know, especially when the object referred to is not palpably 
present, that the assumed or reflected fact is truly so ? How do 
you know in the given case that the thought has submitted so 
completely to the control of fact as to be not merely accepted as 
true, but worthy of acceptance ? 

In the course of reflection on this subject, various criteria have 
been proposed : the force and liveliness of the impression, clear . 
ness and distinctness of the thought, inconceivability of the oppo- 
site, coherency and systematic connection of ideas, verifiability 
in some definite experience. To some only certain propositions 
have seemed to require a criterion by which their certainty might 
be assured, other propositions appearing as self-evident. To 
some, again, the differences in propositions and in the kinds of 
subject-matter have seemed to demand corresponding differences 
in the criteria of their truth ; Aristotle, we remember, regarded it 
as a mark of defective education to require the same kind of evi- 
dence in ethics that is demanded in mathematics. At the present 
time the most prominent candidate for favor in this field offers us 
a universal criterion ; it is the theory of pragmatism that every 
claimant to truth is tested by the satisfactoriness of its working. 
But pragmatism is more catholic still ; for while explaining how 
truth is tested, it professes at the same time to explain what truth 
is. Truth, it says in effect, is not a quality belonging from all 
eternity to some propositions and not to others ; it is something 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 131 

made in the process of what is called validation or verification. 
This conception gives a new meaning to the idea of ' agreement ' 
in the definition of truth. The process of truth-making implies, 
not a static agreement, but a ' fitting ' of the idea or meaning 
with the facts functionally, so that we are led by the idea from a 
less to a more satisfactory experience, from a less to a more 
satisfactory mode of thought, and are thus enabled to deal with 
our experience, in its various parts and aspects and as a whole, 
more effectively than if, instead of adopting the idea or supposi- 
tion which is thus established as true, we had adopted some other 
idea or supposition. The test of a claimant to truth, then, is just 
this effective working ; and that it works effectively, that it leads 
to good and useful consequences, leads to harmony and control 
of the processes of our experience, is precisely what we mean by 
calling it true. What does not so lead is rejected as, and is, 
error. Thus the whole problem of truth is solved at a stroke. 
You know that your thought is true, pragmatism says, when 
being acted on, being followed out in its consequences, theo- 
retical or practical, it leads directly or indirectly to the specific 
experience which it promised, and thereby enables you to deal 
with the concrete situations of your life and with your life as a 
whole in ways which yield, in the long run, the greatest amount 
of satisfaction. You know it is true, because you choose to call 
that true which does this. The proof of the pudding is in the 
eating ; the key that fits is the one that turns the lock. 

If this account is correct, the gist of the pragmatist's conten- 
tion about truth may be expressed in three propositions : (1) 
The test of the truth of an idea, supposal, proposition, judgment, 
or belief is its serviceableness in use ; (2) truth, in the only intel- 
ligible meaning of the term, is a quality belonging to the ideas, 
beliefs, etc., that are capable of meeting this test ; (3) since use 
is relative to ever-changing conditions, truth lives and has its 
being in a process of development, — it is something made, not 
ready-made, or, put bluntly, it is an event that happens. 

With the first of these propositions, that which declares the 
test of truth to lie in its serviceableness in use, I at least, provided 
I am allowed to interpret the phrase, have no quarrel. A claim- 



132 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

ant to truth, whenever its truth is not self-evident, must submit to 
be tested ; and it is difficult to see how it could be better tested 
than by putting it to work. Even a ' self-evident ' truth, like the 
law of identity, is known only by abstraction from its use in 
innumerable instances, and gets its meaning defined and qualified 
by application. How otherwise, while acknowledging that S is vS 
and P, P, should we not hesitate ever to utter a simple propo- 
sition of the form S is P? But here everything depends on the 
interpretation. ' Serviceableness in use ' may be taken so nar- 
rowly as to make a lie which saves a life or extricates from an 
embarrassment a splendid truth, and the recognition of a disaster 
which paralyzes the energies of the man affected by it a fatal 
error. On the other hand, it may be taken so broadly as to 
include all other criteria, and especially that of the systematic 
coherency or harmony of experience and thought, since one of 
the uses of ' true ' thought will certainly be to reduce the various 
items of our world to consistency, and to develop insight into 
and comprehension of the nature of things. Of the second propo- 
sition I am more doubtful ; for though I admit that theoretically 
every truth implies capacity of verification, I am by no means 
sure that this is the sole meaning of truth, and still less convinced 
that we are justified in assuming that every truth must needs be 
capable of actual verification under the conditions of our human 
experience. As there are even now truths acknowledged of some 
which are yet unacknowledged of many, why may there not be 
truths forever incapable of being thought, acknowledged, or vali- 
dated by any human individual ? I understand, however, the 
pragmatist to mean that every truth has an actual or potential 
existence in human experience. This is suggested by the third 
proposition, which appears to make truth a quality of our knowl- 
edge, and change and growth in our knowledge a process of 
change and growth in truth. Our analysis leads to a different 
interpretation. I have maintained, namely, that we must dis- 
tinguish in cognition the act or process, the object that it is 
about, and the objective content of the supposal, the meaning 
expressed in a that-sentence when truth or falsity is predicated of 
the proposition. I have further maintained that true and false are 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 33 

primarily predicates of this objective meaning and only second- 
arily predicates of our judgments and beliefs. Finally, I have 
contended that this meaning is not a subjective apprehension, but 
an objectively apprehended somewhat, having logical characters 
of its own, much as physical objects have physical characters, 
independent of their recognition by any finite mind. Consequently 
I hold, with Mr. B. Russell, that some propositions, that is, their 
objective meanings, are true, and some false, just as some roses 
are red and some white ; in other words, that the proposition, if 
true, bears, as such, a purely logical relation to the fact that it is 
true of, and that this relation is not a process or event, like the 
cognitive process through which it gets into our minds, but 
merely, — to use the familiar expression, — one that ideally holds 
or obtains. Hence the claim to universality, a claim which, of 
course, if it is to be acknowledged, must be tested in a process of 
knowledge, but the validity or falsity of which is not first made 
when it is first made out. Thus the realm of meanings to which 
the objectives of our judgments belong constitutes, in my view, 
not a realm of actualities, but one of ideal possibilities. Unless 
we are prepared for the metaphysical interpretation of a universal 
consciousness, it cannot be said to exist, save as particular items 
of it appear from time to time in recognizing minds. What sort 
of existence has the truth that Caesar once lived when nobody is 
thinking it ? The presence of a truth in a consciousness, from 
the logical point of view, can only be regarded as an accident, 
that is, as an incident due to empirical conditions, and not neces- 
sarily contained in the conception of the meaning. It is some- 
thing that the individual mind may become conscious of, but 
again may not. It may be objected that this notion of an objec- 
tive truth distinct from the objective fact that it is the truth of 
and logically independent of subjective belief, is a fiction. It may 
plausibly be held that the only terms we have here to deal with 
are the objective fact and somebody's idea, opinion, or belief about 
the fact, and that the only question at issue is that of their 
relation, which is also a fact. I should reply to this by saying 
that, of course, the question cannot be raised about the truth of 
any particular statement unless the statement is first made, and this 



134 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

certainly implies the existence of the ideas or belief involved in 
somebody's mind. But when we consider more closely what the 
statement means, we find that its meaning is not limited, as is the 
act of judgment or the disposition of belief that it defines, to its 
existence in the temporal flow of anybody's consciousness. This 
is a peculiarity of the logical aspect of our thought, and this, I 
take it, is as deserving of recognition as are the facts of mental 
or of extra-mental existence. 

Pragmatism, in the view of its advocates, is so much the sub- 
ject of misunderstanding that I shall not be surprised if I am told 
that my criticism is beside the point. I have the feeling myself 
that it may be so ; for the writings of those who are commonly 
regarded as pragmatists make on me the impression of a conflux 
of tendencies rather than that of a settled doctrine that has been 
worked out to a common agreement. It is hard sometimes to 
tell whether a particular statement by a pragmatist writer is to 
be taken literally, or whether it is to be taken sympathetically, 
with a large license to the imagination. My object, however, is 
not so much to criticise as to offer considerations that may serve 
to bring out discussion and to clear up a situation that certainly 
at present seems not a little confused. At the risk, therefore, of 
appearing to misunderstand and in the hope of a solution, I will 
venture to mention two other difficulties that have occurred to 
me in the endeavor to follow the current of the pragmatist ten- 
dency. The first relates to the instrumental character of thought, 
the second to truth's claim of universality. 

I. Pragmatism insists, as we have done, on particular truths 
rather than on the ' truth ' of system, on relative truth rather than 
on truth absolute, recognizing, however, as we also have done, 
the important function of particular truths to hang together in 
systems. But whereas we have regarded the supposal or belief 
so to say structurally, as in itself reflecting or not reflecting the 
state of the facts, pragmatism, at least in one of its tendencies, 
appears to regard it solely in its instrumental character as a plan 
of action and means of effective control of situations. But, grant- 
ing the instrumental nature of thought, must we not also in the 
end adopt once more the structural point of view ? The idea con- 



No. 2.] THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 135 

ceived, let us say, as a plan of action, — though many of our ideas, 
and notably those of the man in the much discussed illustration 
who, lost in the woods, ideally constructs his environment, seem 
rather to instigate than to be themselves plans of action, — the 
idea, we will suppose, has been worked out ; it has been verified ; 
it has fulfilled its purpose ; it has been found true. What, then, 
we ask, is the relation of this true, validated, fulfilled idea to the 
facts ? We surely cannot say now that it is true because it leads 
to consequences which validate it, for whatever further conse- 
quences it may have, it has already been validated. Pragmatism 
perhaps might answer that in this case we read the consequences 
retrospectively. But even so, the process has clearly come to 
a pause, been summed up, stands there in its result relatively 
complete. We have discovered, for example, that the creature 
dimly discerned through the foliage was a stag by tracking and 
shooting it ; does the now verified truth that it is this noble animal 
mean only the particular hunting activities by which this truth has 
been surely ascertained ? Or does it mean certain further conse- 
quences to be realized by action, for example, the supper by the 
camp fire and the antlered trophy in the hall at home ? It means, 
that is, suggests, implies, stands for, leads up to all this, or it 
may ; but does it not, as truth, mean a certain structural relation 
of the ideas to the fact, and does it not mean this all along ? 

2. Pragmatists seem at times to come perilously near saying 
that what seems true to you is true, provided it effectively meets 
your requirements ; or, again, that it is true, if it meets the tem- 
porary demands of a group or generation. Truth is in the mak- 
ing ; the truth of one age is the error of the next. And if we 
say, not that truth is useful, but that truth is the useful or the 
expedient, are we not bound to say that whatever is found use- 
ful in any respect, as, for example, in satisfying an emotional in- 
terest, is true in so far forth ? Hence the charge that for prag- 
matism truth is ' any old thing that works.' This would, of 
course, be absurd. To interpret the doctrine, we must say, I 
think, that nothing is ever true simply, but is only true for me, 
for you, or for them. But how does this agree with the demand 
of logical universality that every proposition taken for true 



136 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

claims ? The pragmatist theory of truth itself, for example, is 
just now urging its claims to general acceptance, not because 
Professor James and a few other philosophers find that it 
' works,' or proves satisfactory, to them, but because, being a true 
theory, we, as reasonable beings, ought to accept it ; and were 
Professor James alone in his belief, an Athanasius contra mundutn, 
he would still, I presume, find its lack of social recognition no 
evidence of its failure as truth, but would, appealing to future 
experience, try more than ever to convert the rest of us. How 
now does the pragmatist explain this character of logical univer- 
sality which even he, when he argues with us, assumes to belong 
to his truth ? I cannot speak for him ; but taking him literally, 
in some of his utterances, I should suppose he might say, we 
make this demand because, on the whole, we find it better to as- 
sume that we live in a common world, and that truths about it 
are common truths, than to assume that every man has a private 
truth and world of his own ; it works better intellectually and 
practically. ' On the whole ' it no doubt does. But the prag- 
matic testing, I supposed, was to be applied not merely in gen- 
eral, but in particular. And in the case of the martyrs of science 
who have died for their truth, might it not have seemed to 'work* 
better to conform to the generally accepted opinions, to what we 
now characterize as prejudice and error? I am speaking not of 
the inherent agreement of truth and fact which, with its implica- 
tion of a constitution in the nature of fact, is the anti-pragmatist's 
explanation of universality, but of its relation to general recogni- 
tion. How in a particular case can pragmatism justify, in this 
regard, a deviation from accepted social standards ? The appeal, 
in the case of such a departure, is not to actual and effective 
working in this regard, but to an ideal possible working, which 
assumes the principle, but which gives, and in the nature of the 
case can give, no actual verification of it. It is not enough to 
reply that the martyrs of science found it more satisfactory to die 
faithful to their convictions than to surrender their convictions to 
the popular clamor, for this only gives us the criterion of private 
feeling and not effective working on the whole. So far as ap- 
pears, we shall have to adopt, on the principles of pure pragma- 



No. 2.J THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. 1 37 

tism, one of two alternatives : either the assumed logical univer- 
sality of truth is without justification, since there are instances in 
which it cannot be practically verified, — in which case, it may 
be disallowed, whenever to do so seems to work better ; or it is 
justified by the fact that it is found to hold in many or the major- 
ity of instances, — in which case, the appeal is made to mere 
numbers. But the principle itself is appealed to in every discus- 
sion that aims to convince by argument. Hence it seems to be 
something that claims acceptance not merely because it works,, 
but because it is seen to be the indispensable condition of any 
finally harmonious working in a world rationally ordered and 
socially common. The objection that pragmatism fails to give a 
satisfactory account of the universality of truth has been fre- 
quently made. It was urged, for example, by Professor Royce 
in his address before this Association four years ago at the meet- 
ing at Princeton ; it has recently been urged, with great acute- 
ness, from a somewhat different point of view, by Professor Bald- 
win in his work on Genetic Logic. 1 This, perhaps, more than 
anything else, is the stumbling-block in the way of many to ac- 
cepting the pragmatist's account of truth as final and complete. 
It is greatly to be hoped that discussion may bring out the true 
bearing of the pragmatist's contention on this point, that we may 
see clearly what justification, if any, can be given to the demand 
that what is true for me shall be true for you also. 

H. N. Gardiner. 
Smith College. 

1 See especially the article " On Truth," Psychological Review, July, 1907^ 






PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL 

ASSOCIATION: THE SEVENTH ANNUAL 

MEETING, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 

DECEMBER 26-28, 1907. 

Report of the Secretary. 

HHE seventh annual meeting of the American Philosophical 
-*- Association was held at Cornell University, Ithaca, New- 
York, on December 26, 27, and 28, 1907. At the business 
meeting the following report of the Treasurer, for the year 
ending December 31, 1907, was read and accepted : 

The balance on hand, as reported by Professor Hibben, Decem- 
ber 31, 1906, was $177.44. After the acceptance of the report 
by the Association, Professor Hibben received from dues of mem- 
bers $2.00, making a total of $179.44. Of this amount he spent 
$10.00 to defray the expenses of the Columbia 'smoker'; 
$31.50 for printing and stationery; $6.35 for clerical aid and 
stenographer ; $3.91 for postage and telegraph ; or a total of 
$51.66, leaving a balance of $127.78, which was turned over to 
the new Secretary, who presents the following statement for the 
year 1907 : 

Frank Thilly, Secretary and Treasurer, in Account 
with the American Philosophical Association. 

Receipts. 
Received from John Grier Hibben, the former 

Secretary and Treasurer $127.78 

Received from Dues and the sale of Proceedings 191.90 
Interest 2.30 

Total . $321.98 

Expenses. 
Printing Proceedings of the Association for 

1906 $i5-4 2 

Stamps and Envelopes 11.60 

Reply Postals 5.00 

167 



1 68 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVIL 

Announcements of Meeting, Stamps, and 

Envelopes 5.10 

Printing of Programmes, Stamps, and Envelopes 10. 75 

Stationery and Printing 3. 00 

Clerical Aid and Stenographer 8.65 

Express 1.29 

$ 60.81 
Balance on hand, December 31, 1907. 261.17 

Total $321.98 

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year : 
President, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, of Harvard University; 
Vice-President, Professor W. P. Montague, of Columbia Uni- 
versity; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell 
University ; Members of the Executive Committee, Professor Ernest 
Albee, of Cornell University, and Professor Ralph Barton Perry, 
of Harvard University. 

The following were elected to membership in the Association : 
Professor Frank C. Doan, The Meadville Theological School ; 
Dr. Bernard Capen Ewer, Northwestern University ; Professor A. 
Ross Hill, Cornell University ; Professor James Gibson Hume, 
Toronto University ; and Dr. Isaac Husik, Gratz College, Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 

Upon motion the President was instructed to appoint a com- 
mittee of three (including the chairman) to consider the advis- 
ability of undertaking the publication of certain works of early 
American philosophers, and to present a report at the next meet- 
ing. Professors Gardiner, Royce, and Dr. I. W. Riley were 
named as members of the Committee. 

It was voted that the selection of the time and place of the 
next meeting be left with the Executive Committee. 

A resolution was passed by the Association " gratefully ac- 
knowledging the most courteous hospitality of the members of 
Cornell University." 

The following are abstracts of the papers read at the meeting : 
The Problem of Truth. H. N. Gardiner. 

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 
1908) of the Philosophical Review.] 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 69 

Visualization in Logic. George R. Montgomery. 

A system of visualization is valuable both for giving a different - 
line of approach, and for articulating logic with mathematics. A 
system, useful both in formal and in inductive logic as well as in 
showing the relation between the two, can be based upon any 
system of geometrical coordinates where the relation to a certain 
point or axis is the basis. Any other particular relation will fall 
in its projection either within or outside the limits of the given 
fixed relation. 

In formal logic, where the universe of discourse is impliedly 
present, the extension of terms may be represented by radii drawn 
to the circumference, having lines for the predicate, light lines for 
the subject, and unfinished radii for the possibilities in particular 
propositions. Such a system will be like Euler's circles, with the 
substitution of segments for circles, and like Lambert's lines, with 
the substitution of arcs for lines, besides having many advantages 
of its own. The easy rotation of the radii about the centre will 
enable a single figure to represent the different possibilities in any 
single proposition, and, the negation of the terms being constantly 
visualized, conversion can be readily pictured, as can also the 
various propositions which differ from the conventional four. By 
letting broken radii represent the middle term, the system can also 
be used in syllogisms, where single diagrams will sufficiently 
represent each form. 

Such a system of visualization will be at the same time related 
to the representation by polar coordinates and also to representa- 
tion by rectilinear coordinates. In the latter case, the j/-axis is 
regarded as the circumference of an infinite circle. The system is 
also directly related to the system of points suggested by Kempe 
in his paper : " On the Relation between the Logical Theory of 
Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Points" (Proc. London 
Math. Soc, Vol. XXI, p. 147). 

The Nature of Absolute Knowledge in Hegel. G. W. Cunning- 
ham. 
In the conception of absolute knowledge, as reached by the 

Phenomenology of Mind, we have Hegel's definition of the nature 



170 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

of thought as it appears in concrete experience. This interpreta- 
tion finds its justification, not only in explicit statements to be 
found in the preface of the Phenomenology, but also in the actual 
procedure of the Phenomenology itself, which is an investigation of 
experience from the epistemological point of view. Whatever 
may have been Hegel's view concerning the relation between 
the standpoint of absolute knowing and that of Absolute Experi- 
ence, there seems to be no doubt that his point of departure in 
arriving at the former is the knowing experiences of finite indi- 
viduals. Some of the more important characteristics of thought 
upon which Hegel here lays emphasis are the following : {a) In 
opposition to Kant and Fichte, who after all make thought essen- 
tially subjective, the standpoint of absolute knowledge emphasizes 
the essential objectivity of thought. And such objectivity, we 
are informed, implies that thought does express the essence of 
things, that is, is adequate to the real ; and, secondly, that thought 
is not to be regarded as a private or particular state of the indi- 
vidual, but as in a sense transcending the individual, (b) Thought, 
therefore, being truly objective, has no datum opposed to and 
independent of it ; on the contrary, it exhausts reality. But this 
is not to reduce reality to terms of mere abstract thought. For 
(c) thought is to be conceived of as possessing genuine univer- 
sality ; in Professor Bosanquet's phraseology, it is a process, not 
of selective omission, but of synthetic analysis. Thus the cate- 
gories are concrete universals, identity in difference, and not blank 
identity, (d) Finally, thought has its criterion of truth immanent 
within it ; indeed, truth is progressively defined only by means of 
its activity. 

Evolution and the Miraculous. Gabriel Campbell. 

[Read by title. This paper will be published in full in the 
Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1908.] 

The Bible in the History of Philosophy. Isaac Husik. 

The Bible and Greek Philosophy were developed in the main 
(so far as the first two divisions of the Canon are concerned and 
the early parts of the Hagiographa) independently of each other ; 
and not until each was essentially complete did historical accident 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 171 

bring them together in Alexandria. Here reciprocal influence 
was inevitable. The individuality of each was strong and not to 
be crushed. The one claimed to be the revealed word of God ; 
the other, the conclusion of experience and reason. Extremists 
rejected one or the other. The rest accepted the two pillars of 
knowledge, i. e., authority and reason, and endeavored to prove 
that there was no opposition between them. On the one hand, 
the Bible caused all the weight to be laid on the transcendental 
instead of the natural. The doctrine of the Trinity had an im- 
mediate influence on the fate of Nominalism and Realism. On 
the other hand, the conclusions of philosophy, particularly the 
Aristotelian philosophy, influenced the understanding of the 
Bible. In order to harmonize the physics and metaphysics of 
Aristotle with the Bible, and to find Aristotle's teachings therein, 
recourse was had to allegorical interpretation, to esoteric mean- 
ings. Hence each school of philosophy had a different concep- 
tion of the teachings of the Bible. To determine with precision 
how the text of the Bible influenced any thinker in formulating 
his philosophical views, we must know when he lived and in 
what schools he was trained. These general statements may be 
illustrated in Philo. The method as well as the content of his 
philosophy bears distinct traces of Biblical influence, viz., his God, 
Logos. In his method of interpretation, he changed the map of 
the Bible, so to speak. Philo influenced some of the writers of 
the New Testament and the Fathers of the Church, e. g., Clement 
of Alexandria and Origen. What has been said of the Patristic 
period applies equally to the early Scholastic period from the eighth 
to the twelfth centuries. The Jews were subject to Mohammedan 
rule, and got Aristotle from the Arabs. The Bible they knew 
in the original. The Mishna and Talmud were used as collateral 
authorities. The synthesis of Maimonides was superior to that 
of Abelard or Scotus Erigena, because more methodical and 
rational. The second Scholastic period, from the thirteenth cen- 
tury, was different from the first. The whole of Aristotle was 
known through translations. The effect was twofold : (a) Widen- 
ing of the sphere of philosophy to include all branches of thought 
represented in the Aristotelian corpus ; (b) narrowing of the sphere 



172 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

of philosophy by separating out specifically religious doctrine. 
This separation was emphasized later by the Nominalists. Inter- 
pretation with Lessing and Kant was no longer naive and spon- 
taneous, but conscious and artificial, in the interest of the moral 
law. 

The Teaching of the History of Philosophy. Brother 
Chrysostom. 
[Read by title.] 

The Factual. Walter T. Marvin. 

By the 'factual' is meant the content of which we are immedi- 
ately aware. The problem of the paper is : Are there judgments 
of which the factual forms the complete warrant ; and if so, how 
are these judgments related to the remainder of our knowledge ? 

The chief premise of the paper is that any body of knowledge 
can be regarded as a deductive argument and as such can be 
submitted to logical analysis to determine its premises. The 
ultimate premises, i. e. t the premises that are not conclusions 
from other premises, are called primary judgments. These can 
be conceivably of three kinds : axioms (assumptions that we are 
unable either to prove or to disprove) ; factual judgments (those 
having full factual warrant) ; logical leaps (pure inductive 
inferences). 

That human knowledge is not a deduction from axioms alone, 
all admit. Can it be from axioms and logical leaps ? That 
mere guess plus a few axioms should have given us a body of 
knowledge as consilient as the special sciences, would be little 
less than miraculous. In fact, all admit that what we see and 
hear does influence our knowledge ; but by hypothesis this in- 
fluence can be only that which a premise has upon a conclusion. 
In short, there must be judgments having full factual warrant, 
e. g., mere awareness of difference between red and green, or 
that a is bigger than b. 

It will be objected : First, none of our actual judgments are 
merely factual and primary. Reply : Our actual judgments are 
logically complex in which factual judgments exist but cannot 
be isolated. Secondly, their existence would mean a limitation 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 173 

to the scope of the principle of contradiction, since such judg- 
ments in no way depend upon consilience with other judgments 
for their proof. Reply : Such limitation would not mean that 
these judgments might contradict one another because they are 
absolutely particular. Only conclusions from them can contra- 
dict, and this would require not new premises but a revision of 
our inferences. 

Thus part of our premises have immediate warrant ; others 
(logical leaps) and our conclusions await their proof, and the 
principles of consilience form the basis of this proof. Moreover, 
the existence of these factual judgments must be taken into 
account in working out a theory of judgment. The judgments 
usually made the basis of study are often highly complex, in 
short, can be analyzed into several judgments. That is, a judg- 
ment is mere awareness of relation between terms. 

The Mental Process in Cognition. A. E. Taylor. 

The real ' Copernican revolution ' in modern philosophy has 
been made by Avenarius rather than by Kant. What Avenarius 
has done is to show how the subjectivism which infects most 
modern philosophy is due to the confusion of two views of the 
relation of the external world to the knowing individual. Accord- 
ing to one of these views, the external world is the cause or 
stimulus of which knowledge is the effect; according to the other, 
the external world is related to the knower simply as the object 
of his apprehension. The relation of cause and effect holds good 
between various constituents of this object, but must not be con- 
ceived as subsisting between the object of knowledge and the 
knower. From the thoroughgoing rejection of a ' cause and 
effect ' theory of knowledge, some important consequences may 
now be deduced. The starting-point for a theory of knowledge 
is not the existence of stimuli, but the existence of a multitude of 
apprehended objects, colors, tones, bodies, concepts, feelings, emo- 
tions, volitions, etc. On inspection this aggregate is found to fall 
into two minor mutually exclusive aggregates, that of ' mental ' 
states or processes, and that of extra-mental things. The peculiar 
characteristic of the members of the mental aggregate is that any 



174 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

proposition asserting their existence can be replaced, without 
change of meaning, by one which asserts a predicate of the know- 
ing subject itself. This is not true of the aggregate of the extra- 
mental. When I experience blue, it is not I who am blue, but 
some presented object other than the experiencing ' I.' Now 
the extra-mental, as thus denned, includes not only bodies and 
their perceived qualities, but all so-called ' mental images,' 
' ideas,' ' concepts.' None of these are what they have too 
often been called, ' states of mind ' ; their predicates are funda- 
mentally different from those of the processes in which they are 
apprehended. They are, in fact, objects experienced, not proc- 
esses of experiencing. What, then, are the mental processes 
involved in cognition ? The sole ultimate cognitive process of 
which we know is belief, or judgment, and it is of processes of 
judging, not of 'ideas,' that knowledge is built up. Perception 
is, e. g., properly, simply the assertion of an existential proposi- 
tion which includes in its meaning a reference to present time and 
to a determinate region of space. The cognitive process thus 
takes its place by the side of the other forms of the Yes-No atti- 
tude of mind towards its objects, which it is the function of Psy- 
chology to study. There is no reason to believe in the existence 
of any simpler or more ultimate mental processes corresponding 
directly to the action of stimuli on the organism. The alleged 
correspondences established by Psychophysics between variation 
in mental process and variation in stimulus should be conceived 
of rather as correlations between variations in the qualities 01 
bodies outside my skin and variations in the behavior of an object 
in space inside my skin, viz., my nervous system. The chief dif- 
ficulty likely to be suggested by the foregoing view of ' ideas ' 
as extra-mental objects is the question, " What kind of object, in 
particular, is it that we apprehend when we have, e. g. y a visual 
image of the face of an absent or dead person ? " One may per- 
haps reply, that the object in such cases is identical with the real 
physical object of the corresponding actual perception, the only 
difference lying in the bodily concomitants of the experience, just 
as the object I see when I look into a mirror is really not a 
* reflection ' of my body, but my own body itself, ' mirror- 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 75 

vision ' and direct vision differing not in the object apprehended, 
but only in the character of the physical cause of the accompany- 
ing stimulation of the retina. Images would thus be, for a theory 
of knowledge, merely a peculiar class of percepts, percepts of 
what does not actually exist as a constituent of my present 
physical environment. That such perception of what does not 
actually exist is possible is shown by any case of genuine hal- 
lucination. The interpretation of the presented image as stand- 
ing for past or future real physical fact, of course, belongs not to 
the object, but to the judgment made about it. In any case, it is 
false to speak of knowing as a process of combining ' ideas,' 
since knowing is a mental process, and 'ideas' are extra-mental 
objects. To know is not to put extra- mental things into certain 
relations, but to affirm that they are so related. Two general 
corollaries may be appended, (i) A sound philosophy has to 
start with concessions both to Dualism and to Pluralism. Both 
the contrast between the I-element and the extra-mental ele- 
ments in the world of the experienced, and the plurality of I-ele- 
ments, or knowers, appear among its data, and cannot be simply 
suppressed in its result. The real difficulty is not to see how 
there can be a reality ' behind ' ' phenomena,' but how any 
element in the real presented world can be mere ' appearance.' 
(2) Of existing doctrines that which approximates most closely 
to the truth is probably the Monadism of Leibniz, though it is 
clear that some of the logical postulates of Monadism must be 
false, since they lead to the view that the physical world is made 
up of distinct and independent causal series, and there is good 
reason to regard this conclusion as untrue. 

Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy. Norman 
Smith. 

This paper has a twofold aim : First, to state the arguments 
which seem to prove that subjectivism in all its various forms is 
incoherent and untenable ; secondly, to present for discussion 
that particular form of realism which seems to contain most 
promise for satisfactory solution of the complex problems in- 
volved. The contradiction involved in subjectivism consists in its 



176 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

view of our ideas as standing to objects in a twofold simultaneous 
relation : cognitively, as their apprehensions, and mechanically, as 
their effects. The first is a relation of inclusion, the second is a 
relation of exclusion. The first view of mental states must be 
accepted if the subjectivist argument is to have a starting-point ; 
it cannot be valid if the subjectivist conclusion is correct. The 
only way of escape seems to be that which is followed by Aven- 
arius and by Bergson. We must deny that sensations are effects 
generated or occasioned by the brain. The brain is the organ 
only of our activities and not of our consciousness. Avenarius 
fails, however, to establish this realistic philosophy. Bergson, 
on the other hand, has developed it in commendable detail, show- 
ing how it may adequately interpret the known empirical facts. 

The Objectivity of Knowledge. Edmund H. Hollands. 

The aim of this paper is to consider the bearing upon objective 
idealism of a new type of realism. This neo-realism is sharply 
distinguished from the older realism by an explicit rejection of 
the representative theory of knowledge. In this it agrees with 
idealism ; but it differs from it in holding also that knowledge 
makes no difference to the facts. This necessitates a polemic 
against idealism. Thus far, all the realistic writers have assumed 
that the fundamental tenet of idealism is, that esse is percipi. This 
is a radical misconception of the idealistic statement that reality 
is spiritual, for this is not meant in a psychological and subjective 
sense, and it is a conclusion, not a point of departure. A further 
objection of G. E. Moore to the idealistic definition of reality is 
invalid, as it involves an untenable distinction between possibility 
and reality. The idealist, therefore, accepts the realist's polemic 
against subjectivism, while denying its application to his own 
theory. On the constructive side, neo-realism has taken two 
directions. One set of writers regard consciousness as ' awareness,' 
which is the same for any objects whatever. Consciousness as 
mere awareness, however, is only an analytic abstraction. Others 
define consciousness as a relation, of meaning, between the ob- 
jects. This second definition has not as yet been very clearly 
stated or exemplified. However, even if we admit a relational 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 177 

definition of consciousness, its implications are not, as has been 
supposed, realistic. Terms presuppose relations, just as much as 
relations presuppose terms. Nor does the supposition that the 
terms are ' simples ' avoid this conclusion, especially when we raise 
the question as to the truth of a proposition or of an inference. 
When it is pointed out that objects are shown by evolution to be 
prior to consciousness, and that consciousness is not a permanent 
relation, it may be replied that objects are nevertheless admitted 
to be determined for knowledge, and that time is no less a diffi- 
culty for the realist than for the idealist. To start, then, with 
relations, and try to arrive at reals, and to start with reals and try 
to arrive at their relations, are equally abstract procedures. The 
first is the method of subjective idealism ; the second is, appar- 
ently, that of this type of realism, in so far as it is in any way 
distinguishable from idealism. The concrete reality is a system 
of related things ; and the metaphysical problem is, What is the 
nature of this system ? 

What is the Function of a General Theory of Value ? Wilbur 
Urban. 

In the first part of the paper the writer argued for the neces- 
sity of a general theory of value, which, being based upon 
general psychological analysis, would make possible a systematic 
treatment and fruitful genetic correlation of the different values 
and value judgments of Economics, Ethics, ^Esthetics, and 
Religion. In the development of the argument, the writer 
showed that the present change of emphasis from truth to value 
had brought to light the interrelation of all values and the 
inadequacy of the points of view and methods of these separate 
sciences of value when working alone. From such a general 
theory, it was further argued, in the second part of the paper, 
would develop an axiological point of view, similar to the 
epistemological, in which the nature and grounds of the objec- 
tivity of value judgments would be determined, as well as their 
relation to factual and truth judgments. The paper [which was 
published in full in the January number of the Philosophical 
Review] seeks in addition to estimate the contributions already 
made to such a general theory. 



178 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

Ultimate Reality and Progress. J. A. Leighton. 

A brief discussion of the relation between the notion of spiritual 
progress in individuals, cultures, and peoples, and the notion of 
time-transcending, intrinsic, intellectual and moral values. The 
discussion started from the premise that the validity of truth, as 
a systematic organization of values, and ethical goods, as realized 
in a systematic whole of sentient beings, presupposed the reality 
of a dynamic and systematic whole of meanings or intrinsic 
values in the universe ; in short, the validity of a dynamic intel- 
ligence. The reality of historical progress in and through indi- 
viduals was recognized. This field was designated the realm of 
' historical reality.' It was argued that ultimate reality and his- 
torical reality are not separable kinds of reality ; that ultimate 
reality must manifest itself continuously in the realm of historical 
reality; that, consequently, values are realized in a living 'now,' 
which transcends the temporal distinctions of past, present, and 
future; and that in this living present reality is expressed. It 
was maintained that past and future have real meaning only as 
contained in the concrete, over-historical present. Objections to 
this view were regarded as resting: (1) on a confusion of the 
qualitative and quantitative concepts of reality ; (2) on an illegit- 
imate extension of the notion of terrestrial evolution to the whole 
meaning of reality. It was insisted that the very notion of prog- 
ress implied timelessly valid norms of progress. It was sug- 
gested that there might be a real meaning in progress, while yet 
the notion that ultimate reality progresses in its intrinsic values 
may be illusory. Finite elements of reality may change while 
the unity of values maintains itself invariant. Ultimate reality 
may be a concrete, dynamic unity, ever manifesting itself in the 
processes in and through which finite centres of experience 
realize values, and yet maintaining itself somehow as the 
systematic time-transcending principle of intrinsic values, as the 
unchanging unity of the meanings that are temporally winning 
expression in the realm of finite multiplicity. 
An Introductory Statement of Realism. Bernard C. Ewer. 

Realism, as an epistemological doctrine, exhibits two divergent 
types. According to one, consciousness is a relation, usually 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 179 

called awareness, between the knower and an external object, and 
all qualitative distinctions attributed to consciousness are properly 
regarded as really located in the objects themselves as essential 
qualities or forms of organization. The principal difficulty with 
this view arises in facts like illusions which seem to inhere in the 
nature of consciousness itself. The second type is representa- 
tionism, according to which the object of consciousness is a state 
of consciousness corresponding to an external reality, — a position 
which slips easily into idealism. To save realism, it is necessary 
to hold both of these positions together, i. e., to say (1) that 
consciousness is directly aware of external things, (2) that it has 
internal qualitative differentiations of which it is also conscious, 
and (3) that these characters appear in varying degrees of relative 
prominence in actual experience. It is not a sound objection to 
assert that awareness of external reality is inexplicable ; and the 
alleged inconsistency between such awareness and the temporal 
duration of intermediate physical processes, e. g. y light, fails if 
awareness may be retrospective. Where the object of conscious- 
ness is conscious content itself, there is in general no real distinc- 
tion between the two. Denials of this identity serve only to show 
that there may be a superimposed self-consciousness, and so miss 
the point. The best statements about these two characters, 
awareness and conscious content, are furnished by descriptive 
psychology. It is objected that the assertion of such a dualistic 
nature as essential to consciousness is unphilosophical, since there 
is an inevitable presumption in favor of reducing one character to 
the other. To do this, however, is to belie the facts, and simply 
to continue the outstanding differences of epistemological theory. 

The Problem of Sin. H. H. Horne. 

The modern sense of sin is social in character, not ceremonial 
as with primitive peoples, nor individualistic as with the Semites. 
But no school of modern philosophy has as yet adequately inter- 
preted this new phase of the sense of sin. Absolutism proposes 
a solution of the problem of evil that does not sufficiently distin- 
guish physical and moral evil. Pragmatism has not yet treated 
the problem. 



180 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

The question raised by this paper is, Can the problem of sin 
be solved on absolutistic principles and at the same time in accord 
with legitimate pragmatic demands ? The general answer to this 
question is in the affirmative. What sort of a world is it in which 
sin occurs ? Pragmatism says : (i) a temporal world, (2) a world 
in which a better is possible to men, but is not made actual by 
them ; (3) a world in which the better is conceived as the will of 
God for man ; (4) a world that at any moment is, in so far as man 
is a sinner, short of the best possible world; and (5) a world 
whose moral value fluctuates from moment to moment with the 
deeds of men. 

The body of the paper indicates how, by distinguishing the 
temporal from the eternal order, the position of absolutism can 
be so stated as to include and fulfil these pragmatic demands. 
But such reconciliation between absolutism and pragmatism in 
the problem of sin involves the introduction of the idea of an 
Absolute suffering for the sins of men. Sin is man's failure to 
embody as much of God's perfection as he might in the temporal 
order, and the modern social sense of sin means damage to the 
establishment of the will of the Eternal in the kingdom of the 
temporal. 

Discussion : The Meaning and Criterion of Truth. 

William James. 

My account of truth is realistic, and follows the epistemologi- 
cal dualism of common sense. Suppose I say to you : " The 
thing exists," — is that true, or not? How can you tell? Not 
till my statement has unfolded its meaning farther is it determined 
as being true, false, or irrelevant to reality altogether. But if 
now you ask, " What thing ? " and I reply "a desk " ; if you ask 
" where?" and I point to a place; if you ask, "Does it exist 
materially or only in imagination ? " and I say " materially " ; if, 
moreover, I say, "I mean that desk," and then grasp and shake 
a desk which you see just as I have described it, you are willing 
to call my statement true. But you and I are commutable here ; 
we can exchange places ; and as you go bail for my desk, so I 
can go bail for yours. This notion of a reality independent of 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. l8l 

either one of us, taken from ordinary social experience, lies at the 
base of the pragmatist definition of truth. With some such 
reality any statement, to be accounted ' true,' must ' agree.' 
Pragmatists explain this last term as meaning certain actual or 
potential ' workings.' Thus, for my statement, " The thing ex- 
ists," to be true of a determinate reality, it must lead me to 
shake your desk, it must explain itself by terms that suggest that 
desk to your mind, etc. Only thus does it ' agree ' with that 
reality, and give me the satisfaction of your approval. A deter- 
minate reference and some sort of satisfactory adaptation are thus 
constituent elements in the definition of any statement as ' true.' 
And you can't get at the notion of either ' reference ' or 

* adaptation ' except through the notion of ' workings.' That the 

* thing ' is, what it is, and which it is (of all the possible things 
with that what) are points determinable only by the pragmatic 
method. The zvhich means our pointing to a locus ; the what 
means choice on our part of an essential aspect to apperceive the 
thing by (and this is always relative to what Dewey calls our 
' situation ') ; and the that means our assumption of the attitude 
of belief, the reality-recognizing attitude. Surely these workings 
are indispensable to constitute the notion of what ' true ' means 
as applied to a statement. Surely anything less is insufficient. 

Our critics nevertheless call the workings inessential, and con- 
sider that statements are, as it were, born true, each of its own 
object, much as the Count of Chambord was supposed to be 
born King of France, though he never exercised regal functions, 
— no need of functioning in either case ! Pragmatism insists, on 
the contrary, that statements are true thus statically only by 
courtesy ; they practically pass for true ; but you can't define the 
particular truth of any one of them without referring to its func- 
tional results. 

J. E. Creighton. 

A philosophical account of the nature of truth is possible only 
in the light of a general theory regarding the nature of experi- 
ence. The history of the recent discussion regarding Pragmatism 
illustrates the comparative barrenness of philosophical criticism 
which is not carried on from any systematic point of view. The 



182 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

failure of the pragmatists to define their own standpoint, or per- 
haps to take any definite standpoint at all, is mainly responsible 
for the misunderstandings of which they complain. Neverthe- 
less, although the sensational side of Pragmatism, — the account 
of truth in ' practical ' terms, — has been definitely refuted, it is 
possible to regard the pragmatic movement as a protest against 
abstraction, the besetting sin of philosophical constructions. In 
particular, it may be regarded as a protest against a narrow and 
formal view of logical consistency, and therefore as akin in aim 
and spirit to Hegel's appeal from the abstract distinctions of the 
Understanding to the more concrete standpoint of Reason. 

Charles M. Bakewell. 

The impossibility of defining truth in terms of the verifying 
process comes out clearly in the writings of the pragmatists 
themselves wherever time is in question ; for they are then forced 
to admit that " when new experiences lead to retrospective judg- 
ments, using the past tense, what these judgments utter was true, 
even though no past thinker had been led there." This is 
equivalent to making truth consist in a relation that is there to 
be discovered prior to the process of truth getting. And it is a 
fundamental mistake to take the agreement formula as giving the 
original, natural, instinctive, and obvious meaning of truth ; for 
men sought after truth, used the word, knew what they meant, 
and were more or less successful in their search long before they 
were sufficiently self-conscious, and sufficiently sophisticated, to 
understand what the agreement formula means. The natural 
standpoint is far more object-minded, and we get most light on 
the meaning of truth by asking what men are actually after when 
they are seeking truth. As a matter of fact, they are always try- 
ing to anchor a passing experience by getting it in a setting where 
it will ' stay put.' It finally appears that this means trying to con- 
ceive a particular experience in the light of its idea, or concrete 
universal, that is, to conceive it in its total context or setting. 
One is trying to read the momentary fact of experience as it 
comes along in its absolutely total experiential setting, such a 
setting being the one in which no item of possible or actual 
experience is left out. The implication is that each particular 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 83 

object of experience has its definite place in that complete con- 
text, which is commonly referred to as the realm of experience. 
When one appeals to experience as giving the test or control of 
truth, it is always experience in this transcendent sense that is 
meant, transcendent, because it is more than my experiences, or 
the sum of all of our experiences, since it must include the pos- 
sible as well as the actual experiences, and also all experiences 
that once were, but no longer are possible experiences. Truth 
means grasping the transient fact in this transcendent context. 
This context is real, and lives in every fact of experience, being 
just the setting that is needed to give the particular experience 
its own significance. There may be, and are, many contexts, and 
one may, as in the special sciences, view a fact in one context 
ignoring all others. None the less the other contexts are part 
of that same fact's meaning, and to get the truth about it the 
ignored contexts must be restored. So surely as we are entitled 
to refer to experience im prdgnanten Sinne, or to an order or 
realm of experience, so surely must we hold that these partial 
contexts have their place in the complete context ; and, since the 
particular context is defined by the categories through which 
the object is viewed, this is equivalent to saying that all possible 
categories must have their own organic interconnectedness. Thus 
truth finally means vision in the light of the whole. 

John Grier Hibben. 

Pragmatism, when submitted to its own test, is found wanting 
in certain cases. It is obviously inadequate as a theory of truth, 
and this in the following three particulars : 

1. It is inadequate as a working hypothesis. The expedient 
as such is very often found to be a false lead. There are many 
cases of concealed utility which only long stretches of time can 
reveal; moreover, the most significant instances of utility are often 
the result of a combination of a number of separate elements, 
each one of which is in itself absolutely useless. Where the util- 
ity is thus not apparent, it cannot be taken as a practical test of 
immediately necessary choices. Again, in the development of 
science the need has not always created the discovery in order 
to meet it ; but the discovery, due wholly to speculative and 



184 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

theoretical interest, has created the need. As instance of this, I 
would cite the discovery of the relation between magnetism and 
electricity, and the consequent inventions of the telegraph, the 
telephone, and electric motors of various kinds. Needs never 
before imagined have been created by the discovery of this new 
world of knowledge. The demand for the cash value of every 
truth forces a result which represents truth at a discount. For 
cash value in general is secured in most cases only through some 
discounting process. 

2. Pragmatism is inadequate because we instinctively subor- 
dinate its testing principle to higher considerations. While 
emphasizing the importance of purposive thinking, we must not 
forget that we must obey the rules of the game. We think 
towards certain desired ends ; but it is always under the limita- 
tions of rule and penalty. Professor James is conscious of these 
necessities of thought and reality. He speaks repeatedly of the 
need of a moral order, an eternal order, an ideal order, of the 
coercion of our sensible experiences and of our mental operations. 
Our ' funded experience ' is not a collection of particular experi- 
ences, but a system of coordinately related parts showing order, 
coherence, universality, and necessity. We not merely ask the 
question, Does it work ? but the further question, Why does it 
work ? The man who understands best the nature of things and 
their controlling necessities can do most with them practically. 

3. Pragmatism is inadequate because of the limitation of the 
alleged creative function of thought and endeavor. We can force 
things actually to be and to behave according to our wills only 
within limited areas of experience. It is only in a very restricted 
sense that we can be said to make truth. If we are progressing 
towards a more complete unification of the body of our knowl- 
edge, does not the growing coherence and unity indicate an 
underlying ground as well as a desired goal ? 

C. A. Strong. 

The criticisms I am going to offer on Professor James's theory, 
unlike those of previous speakers, will (I think I may say) be from 
his own point of view. I accept his epistemological realism, — 
the view that cognition and object are separate existences, — and 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 85 

his disbelief in an existential Absolute whose business it is to 
bring them into relation ; I hold with him that the existential 
basis of truth must be sought in the concrete connections which 
join them as parts of a universe. My complaint is that his account 
of these connections is incomplete ; that he mentions only those 
by which cognition and object converge in future consequences, 
and overlooks, (1) the causal relations by which the object, or a 
similar object, has produced the cognition ; (2) the spatial con- 
nections between the object and the cognition, or at least between 
the object and the brain-event with which the cognition varies 
uniformly, connections which hold the cognition even now in 
relation to the object, much as a well-aimed gun is held in rela- 
tion to the mark it is going to hit ; (3) the relation of resemblance 
(or correspondence, or conformity, or relevancy, as you please ; 
I refer to the degree of resemblance actually existing) which 
makes this image the right one among all our images to let loose 
the reaction appropriate to that object. 

These relations are antecedent to the consequences, and play 
a more important part than they in constituting the existential 
basis of what we call truth. Or rather, as we ought perhaps to 
say, the connections in their totality, including the consequences 
or workings, constitute the existential basis of cognitive reference) 
and truth, as distinguished from this, lies more especially in the 
relation of resemblance or correspondence. 

To say that truth ' consists in the consequences ' is as if one 
should say that the correctness of a sportsman's aim is not merely 
proved by, but consists in, his actually hitting the bird. But, 
surely, it consists rather in his holding his gun at a certain angle, 
such that, given the laws of physics, the bullet or shot must pass 
through the body of the bird. The correct aiming comes before 
the hitting, and is possible without it. 

Professor James replies that you cannot define what you mean 
by correct aiming without including the concept of hitting. This 
is true, but it is important to note that the hitting is included as 
a potentiality, and not as an actual performance. Suppose the 
world should come to an end at this moment : would my idea, 
e. £•., of Caesar's assassination on the Ides of March be any the 



1 86 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVIL 

less true, because by hypothesis it can have no consequences ? 
The example shows that it is only the potentiality of the conse- 
quences that is essential. But this potentiality, when you con- 
sider it, is exactly equivalent to the relations of space and of cor- 
respondence which predetermine what the consequences shall be. 
Truth, then, is antecedent to the consequences, and does not con- 
sist in them. 

LIST OF MEMBERS. 

Adler, Professor Felix, Columbia University, New York. 
Aikins, Professor H. A., Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, O. 
Albee, Professor Ernest, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Alexander, Dr. H. B., 384 St. James Ave, Springfield, Mass. 
Angier, Dr. R. P., Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Armstrong, Professor A. C, Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Conn. 
Bakewell, Professor Charles M., Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. 
Baldwin, Professor J. Mark, Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md. 
Bawden, Professor H. Heath, Univ. of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O. 
van Becelaere, Rev. E.L., Convent of the Visitation, Georgetown, Ky. 
Bentley, Professor I. M., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Bigelow, Rev. Dr. F. H., 1625 Massachusetts Ave., Washington. 
Brandt, Professor Francis B. , Central High School, Philadelphia, Pa. 
Britan, Professor Halbert Hains, Bates College, Lewiston, Me. 
Brown, Dr. H. C, Columbia University, New York. 
Brown, Professor Wm. Adams, Union Theol. Seminary, New York. 
Bryan, President W. L., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 
Buchner, Professor E. F., University of Alabama, University, Ala. 
Bush, Dr. Wendell T., Columbia University, New York. 
Butler, President N. M., Columbia University, New York. 
Caldwell, Professor W., McGill University, Montreal, Canada. 
Calkins, Professor Mary Whiton, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass. 
Campbell, Professor Gabriel, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H. 
Carus, Dr. Paul, La Salle, III. 

Case, Professor Mary S., Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass. 
Cattell, Professor J. McKeen, Columbia University, New York. 
Chrysostom, Brother, Manhattan College, New York. 
Churchhill, Dr. William, 58 Franklin Sq., New Britain, Conn. 
Coddington, Professor W. P., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 
Coe, Professor George A., Northwestern University, Evanston, 111. 
Cohen, Dr. M. R., College of the City of New York, New York. 
Crawford, Professor A. W., Western Univ. of Pa., Allegheny, Pa. 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 87 

Creighton, Professor J. E., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
'Curtis, Professor M. M., Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, O. 
Cushman, Professor H. E., Tufts College, Boston, Mass. 
Cutler, Professor Anna A., Smith College, Northampton, Mass. 
Daniels, Professor Arthur H., University of Illinois, Urbana, 111. 
Davies, Dr. Henry, Salisbury, Conn. 

Dearborn, Professor G. V. N. , Tufts Medical School, Boston, Mass. 
Dewey, Professor John, Columbia University, New York. 
Doan, Professor F. C, Meadville Theol. School, Meadville, Pa. 
Dodge, Professor Raymond, Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Conn. 
Dolson, Professor Grace Neal, Wells College, Aurora, N. Y. 
Duncan, Professor George M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Everett, Professor Walter G., Brown Univ., Providence, R. I. 
Ewer, Dr. Bernard C, Northwestern University, Evanston, 111. 
Fite, Professor Warner, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind. 
Fogel, Dr. Philip H., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Franklin, Mrs. Christine Ladd, 103 W. Monument St., Baltimore, Md. 
French, Professor F. C, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb. 
Fuller, Mr. B. A. G., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Fullerton, Professor G. S., Columbia University, New York. 
Gardiner, Professor H. N., Smith College, Northampton, Mass. 
Gillett, Professor A. L., Hartford Theol. Sem., Hartford, Conn. 
Gordon, Dr. Kate, Teachers' College, Columbia Univ., New York. 
Gore, Professor Willard Clark, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
Griffin, Professor E. H., Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md. 
Gulliver, President Julia H., Rockford College, Rockford, 111. 
Hall, Professor T. C. , Union Theological Seminary, New York. 
Hammond, Professor W. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Harris, Dr. William T., 1360 Fairmont St., Washington. 
Hayes, Professor C. H., General Theological Seminary, New York. 
Hibben, Professor J. G. , Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Hill, Professor A. Ross, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Hitchcock, Dr. Clara M., Lake Erie College, Painsville, O. 
Hite, Professor L. F., New Church Theol. Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
Hocking, Dr. W. E., University of California, Berkeley, Cal. 
Hoffman, Professor Frank S., Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. 
Hollands, Dr. Edmund H. , Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Home, Professor H. H., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H. 
Hough, Professor W. S., George Washington Univ., Washington. 
Hughes, Professor Percy, Lehigh Univ., South Bethlehem, Pa. 
Hume, Professor J. G., University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada. 



188 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. XVII. 

Husik, Dr. Isaac, Gratz College, Philadelphia, Pa. 
Hyde, President William DeWitt, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. 
Hyslop, Dr. J. H., 519 W. 149th St., New York. 
James, Professor William, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Johnson, Professor R. B. C, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Jones, Professor A. L., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Jones, Professor Rums M., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa. 
Judd, Professor Charles H., Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Keyser, Professor Cassius Jackson, Columbia Univ., New York. 
Ladd, Professor G. T., New Haven, Conn. 

de Laguna, Professor Theodore, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 
Lane, Professor W. B., Lynchburg, Va. 

Lefevre, Professor Albert, Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. 
Leighton, Professor J. A., Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y. 
Lloyd, Professor A. H., Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Lord, Professor Herbert G., Columbia University, New York. 
Lough, Professor J. E., Sch. of Pedagogy, N. Y. Univ., New York. 
Lovejoy, Professor A. O., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. 
Lyman, Professor Eugene W., Bangor Theol. Sem., Bangor, Me. 
MacCracken, Chancellor Henry M., New York Univ., New York. 
MacDougall, Professor R. M., New York University, New York. 
MacKenzie, President William Douglas, Hartford, Conn. 
MacVannel, Dr. J. A., Columbia University, New York. 
Marshall, Dr. Henry Rutgers, 3 West 29th St., New York. 
Martin, Professor Herbert, N. Y. Training Sch. for Teachers, N. Y. 
Marvin, Professor W. T. , Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Mason, Dr. M. Phillips, 347 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 
McAllister, Professor C. N. , State Normal School, Warrensburg, Mo. 
McCormack, Mr. Thomas J., La Salle, 111. 

McGilvary, Professor E. B., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 
McNulty, Professor J. J., College of the City of New York, N. Y. 
Mead, Professor George H., University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
Mecklin, Professor John H., Lafayette College, Easton, Pa. 
Meikeljohn, Professor Alex., Brown Univ., Providence, R. I. 
Miller, Professor Dickinson S., Columbia University, New York. 
Montague, Professor W. P., Columbia University, New York. 
Montgomery, Dr. G. R., 126 W. 104th St., New York. 
Moore, Professor Addison W., University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
Moore, Professor Vida F., Elmira College, Elmira, N. Y. 
Miinsterberg, Professor Hugo, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. 
Newbold, Professor W. R., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 



No. 2.] AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 89 

Ormond, Professor Alexander T. , Princeton Univ., Princeton, N. J. 
Pace, Professor E. A., Catholic Univ. of America, Washington. 
Patton, President Francis L., Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. 
Patton, Professor George S., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Perry, Professor Ralph Barton, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. 
Pitkin, Mr. Walter B., New York Tribune, New York. 
Puffer, Dr. Ethel D., Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass. 
Rand, Dr. Benj., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Raymond, President B. P., Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Conn. 
Raymond, Professor G. L., George Washington Univ., Washington. 
Read, Professor M. S. , Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y. 
Riley, Dr. I. Woodbridge, Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md. 
Ritchie, Dr. Eliza, Wimerick, Halifax, N. S., Canada. 
Robbins, Mr. Reginald C, 373 Washington St., Boston, Mass. 
Rogers, Professor A. K., Butler College, Indianapolis, Ind. 
Rousmaniere, Dr. Frances H., Mt. Holyoke Coll., So. Hadley, Mass. 
Rowland, Dr. Eleanor H., Mt. Holyoke Coll., So. Hadley, Mass. 
Royce, Professor Josiah, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Russell, Professor John E., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. 
Sabine, Dr. George H., Stanford University, California. 
Santayana, Professor George, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. 
Schmidt, Professor Karl, University of Florida, Lake City, Florida. 
Schurman, President J. G., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Sewall, Rev. Dr. Frank, 16 18 Riggs Place, Washington. 
Shanahan, Professor E. T., Catholic Univ. of America, Washington. 
Sharp, Professor Frank C, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 
Shaw, Professor C. G., New York University, New York. 
Sheldon, Professor W. H., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Singer, Professor Edgar A., Jr., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
Smith, Professor Norman, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Sneath, Professor E. Hershey, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Spaulding, Professor E. G., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Squires, Professor W. H., Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y. 
Starbuck, Professor E. D. , University of Iowa, Iowa City, la. 
Steele, Rev. E. S., 1522 Q St., Washington. 

Sterrett, Professor J. M., George Washington Univ., Washington. 
Stewardson, President L. C, Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y. 
Stroh, Mr. Alfred M., Bryn Athyn, Pa. 
Strong, Professor C. A., Columbia University, New York. 
Swenson, Mr. David F., Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 
Talbot, Professor Ellen B., Mt. Holyoke Coll., So. Hadley, Mass. 



190 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 

Tawney, Professor Guy A., University of Illinois, Urbana, 111. 
Taylor, Professor A. E., McGill University, Montreal, Canada. 
Taylor, Professor W. J. , Training School for Teachers, Brooklyn. 
Thilly, Professor Frank, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 
Thompson, Miss Anna Boynton, Thayer Academy, Braintree, Mass. 
Thorndike, Professor E. L., Columbia University, New York. 
Tufts, Professor James H., University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
Urban, Professor Wilbur M., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn. 
Washburn, Professor Margaret F., Vassar Coll., Poughkeepsie, N. Y. 
Weigle, Professor Luther A., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. 
Wenley, Professor R. M. , Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Whitney, Dr. G. W. T., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
Wilson, Professor G. A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 
Woodbridge, Professor F. J. E., Columbia University, New York. 
Woodworth, Professor R. S., Columbia University, New York. 
Wright, Professor H. W., Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, 111. 
(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction 
to be made in the above list. ) 



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